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Abstract
This paper assesses the effect of key demographic changes (population ageing and increas-
ing educational attainment) that are expected by 2030 on the income distribution in the
EU-27 and examines the potential of tax-benefit systems to counterbalance negative devel-
opments. Theory predicts that population ageing should increase income inequality, while
the effect of upskilling is more ambiguous. Tax-benefit systems may stabilize these expected
changes though this is largely an empirical question given their typically complex nature.
We use a decomposition technique to isolate the effect of projected demographic change on
income inequality and poverty from the reaction of the labor market to this demographic
change through wage adjustments. Our results show that demographic change is likely to
lead to increasing inequality while related wage adjustments work mainly in the opposite
direction. Changes to projected relative poverty are minimal for most countries. With a few
exceptions, EU tax-benefit systems are able to absorb most of projected increase in market
income inequality.
Keywords Income distribution · Demography · Labor market · Decomposition
1 Introduction
The labor markets and public finances of EU member states are facing serious challenges
from expected demographic changes over the course of the next few decades. Two long-
term trends — population ageing and upskilling — increasingly contribute to employment
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dynamics (OECD 2014, p.20). These will also shape household income distributions and
are likely to have profound effects on income inequalities and poverty levels. Inequality
and, to a lesser extent, relative poverty have been increasing in most OECD countries from
the mid-1980s to the Great Recession (To´th 2014).
Several theoretical studies have shown that a larger share of older people tends to increase
overall income inequality (e.g von Weizsa¨cker 1988, 1995; Deaton 1997). This is for sev-
eral reasons. According to life cycle theory, within-cohort earnings inequality increases as
cohort members get older due to the cumulative effect of different levels of human capital
investment and learning abilities on incomes over the life course. The ageing of the work-
force alone, therefore, results in less equally distributed (cross-sectional) earnings. A greater
share of retired people increases population income inequality further due to the fact that
retirees have lower incomes compared to workers. An increased proportion of pensioners
also puts the public provision of pensions under pressure, more so if productivity growth
is not sufficient to compensate for a shrinking workforce.1 Further interaction effects with
labor markets as a shrinking working population, other things being equal, is likely to put
upward pressures on wage levels. A call by vonWeizsa¨cker (1996) for more theoretical and,
in particular, empirical research on the distributional implications of ageing appears still
valid today.
Upskilling will also lead to an increase in average earnings, provided that the larger
supply of better educated workers can be absorbed by the economy.2 The effect of skill
upgrading on earnings inequality, however, is ambiguous, depending on the dynamics of
the high-skilled wage premium, among other factors. (Atkinson and Bourguignon 2015).
However, the empirical evidence for the OECD and EU countries to date indicates that
upskilling has not led to increased wage inequality over the last few decades (Fo¨rster and
To´th 2015, p.1801).
There are few other studies which make projections about future labor markets and/or
income distributions. Aziz et al. (2015) use demographic projections combined with a re-
weighting approach to analyze the effect of demographic change on income distributions in
New Zealand in 2010–2060 but abstract from any related wage changes. Their results point
to a small increase in market income inequality, while the inequality of disposable income is
stable or decreasing (depending on the measure). They also show that overall and child po-
verty rates can be expected to decrease by up to 5 percentage points. This illustrates the redis-
tributive capacity of the tax-benefit system in New Zealand. Edwards and Lange (2013) mo-
del the US labor force in 2030 and show how returns to education as well as the gender wage
gap will be affected by demographic change. Their key finding is that the trend in demand
towards more skilled (female) labor will continue to outstrip supply despite rapid increases
in the latter. This will lead to a continuation of the increase in the wage skill premium.
The relevance of population ageing and upskilling is likely to be different across coun-
tries (OECD 2014), which, given theoretical ambiguities, highlights the importance of
(comparative) empirical work. It is even more important to anticipate such influences at
an early stage, in the context of distributional targets such as Europe-2020 (European
Commission 2010).
This study builds on Dolls et al. (2017), which studies the effect of demographic changes
between 2010 and 2030 on labor force participation and government budgets. In this paper,
1vonWeizsa¨cker (1995) also demonstrates that considering the type of funding arrangements and reactions to
avoid fiscal deficits can introduce some ambiguity regarding the effect of ageing on the income distribution.
2CEDEFOP (2012) forecasts for 2020 show trends towards more skill-intensive jobs together with upskilling,
though with scope for mismatches.
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we go beyond fiscal measures and assess how income distributions in the EU are likely
to be affected by future demographic changes such as population ageing and upskilling.
We examine the potential of current tax-benefit systems in the EU-27 to cope with such
changes, showing the implications of each tax-benefit system for future poverty and
inequality.
Our study is related to that of Aziz et al. (2015) for New Zealand in that we employ
reweighting and microsimulation techniques to account for projected demographic changes
between 2010 and 2030. We extend their method by also modeling labor market reactions
to these population changes through wage adjustments, and assess their combined effect on
the income distribution of the EU-27. To the best of our knowledge, no study has attempted
this before.
We also show the effect of demographic change separately from the effect of wage adjust-
ment to this demographic change, drawing on the approach of Bargain and Callan (2010) to
decompose changes in the income distribution. The microsimulation method (Bourguignon
and Spadaro 2006) allows us to simulate projected demographic changes and model wage
reactions, and, by holding everything else constant, to isolate their respective impacts.
We rely on two sets of demographic and skills projections, an optimistic and a pes-
simistic scenario, from Huisman et al. (2013) which make different assumptions about
fertility, life-expectancy, educational attainment, migration and household formation. The
two main trends driving changes in the composition of the work force are population ageing
and the upskilling of the population. Our method of constructing future income distribu-
tions involves, in the first stage, reweighting to make currently observed household-level
data reflect future population structures. In the second stage, we obtain new partial labor-
market equilibrium wage levels by combining changes in the work force resulting from
demographic changes with existing detailed estimates of labor demand and labor sup-
ply elasticities in the literature. To calculate household disposable incomes, we employ
EUROMOD — the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model — which uses EU-SILC data
on household demographic and labor market characteristics as well as market incomes for
nationally representative samples of households as input.
Our results suggest that demographic change is likely to lead to increasing income
inequality while related wage adjustments tend to work in the opposite direction. The com-
bined effect results in a modest increase in income inequality in the EU as a whole, although
cross-country differences in this effect can be expected. We also find that inequality is more
likely to increase in countries which currently have relatively low inequality levels, poten-
tially leading to a convergence in inequalities at the EU level. Results for relative poverty
are more ambiguous with most countries experiencing little or no change in relative poverty.
However, for some countries, policy changes may be needed to keep poverty and inequality
at acceptable levels.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology: how demo-
graphic projections were obtained and linked with the income distribution, the frame-
work for estimating adjustments in the labor market through labor supply and demand
responses and the decomposition method to assess the effects of demographic change
on the income distribution. Section 3 discusses the main demographic trends and the
new equilibrium in the future labor market. Section 4 presents our findings on how
these developments affect the income distributions in the EU countries. Section 5
discusses the stabilizing properties of tax-benefit systems in the EU-27. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Data andmethodology
2.1 Tax-beneﬁt calculator
We use EUROMOD as a basis for our analysis. EUROMOD is a static tax-benefit calcu-
lator for the EU countries, which allows for comparative analysis of tax-benefit systems
and their impact on the income distribution in a consistent way through a common frame-
work (Sutherland and Figari 2013). Based on a representative sample of households of with
information about their socio-demographic and labor market characteristics as well as mar-
ket incomes (e.g. earnings), EUROMOD simulates disposable income for each household
by applying a set of tax-benefit rules. The latter can refer to existing tax-benefit systems
or (user-specified) reform scenarios. EUROMOD has become a heavily applied tool in
inequality research.3
EUROMOD input-data are mainly based on the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat, or its national counterparts, where
available and when they provide more detailed information. Each country component of the
model is thoroughly validated with results documented in a Country Report.4
We use version F6.0 of EUROMOD with input datasets based primarily on the SILC
2008 wave (2007 wave is used for France and 2009 wave for Malta) and the Family
Resources Survey 2008/09 for the UK. The sample size for each country varies from about
10 thousand individuals for Luxembourg and Cyprus to more than 50 thousand individuals
for Italy and the UK.
Our analysis focuses on changes in the distribution of household disposable income,
equivalised to account for household size and composition by using the modified OECD
equivalence scale. Disposable income, as widely used to measure poverty and inequality, is
defined as all household incomes net of taxes and social contributions and after the receipt
of all types of cash benefits. Household market income (or original income) refers to the
total amount of labor income (excluding employer social insurance contributions), capital
income, private pensions and private transfers, i.e. income before taxes and benefits.
2.2 Projections and reweighting
We rely on the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute’s (NIDI) demographic
projections (Huisman et al. 2013) to adjust our micro data such that they reflect population
characteristics of the year 2030 (similar to Dolls et al. 2017). Huisman et al. (2013) take
Eurostat’s EUROPOP2010 projections for the key demographic determinants (fertility rate,
mortality rate, level of net migration) as a reference point (European Commission 2012)
and develop two different scenarios which are labeled as ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’. In addition
to the EUROPOP2010 projections, the scenarios are based on assumptions about internal
(rural-urban) migration (ESPON&NIDI 2010) and educational attainment (KC et al. 2010).
They can be seen as upper and lower bounds of the severity of demographic change. Both
scenarios predict that ageing will be the main demographic trend in the next decades leading
to lower growth rates of the working age population and higher dependency ratios, with the
tough scenario reflecting more pessimistic assumptions about demographic developments
3For recent examples, see Bargain et al. (2017), Figari et al. (2017), Paulus et al. (2017).
4See https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports.
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Table 1 Assumptions underlying the population scenarios
Scenario
tough friendly
International migration low high
Rural-to-urban migration high low
Fertility low high
Increase in life expectancy low high
Educational attainment low high
See Huisman et al. (2013) for more details on the demographic projections. Their tables 1–4 show for each
of the key demographic determinants (fertility rate, life expectancy, net migration) and for each EU-27 mem-
ber state the last observation, the EUROPOP2010 projection for the year 2030 as well as the projections in
the tough and friendly scenario, respectively. For most (but not all) EU-27 countries, projections in the tough
(friendly) scenario are above (below) the EUROPOP2010 projection. Differences in the degree of urbanisa-
tion are small between the two scenarios. For the level of educational attainment, KC et al. (2010)‘s ‘constant
enrolment’ (‘fast track’) scenario is chosen in the tough (friendly) scenario. The tough (friendly) scenario
assumes a stagnation (an increase) in educational attainment
and greater challenges for European policy makers. Table 1 provides a short overview of the
main features of both scenarios.
The demographic projections include joint distributions of age, sex, level of edu-
cational attainment and household position for the EU-27 until 2030.5 We incorpo-
rate these projections into our representative European household micro data by a
reweighting procedure.6 Our baseline micro data contain personal weights for each
individual in our sample in order to adjust for sample design and/or differential non-
response. Every country data set is thus representative for the respective population
in the base year (i.e. 2008). In a first step, we alter the weights such that they
reflect the population size and structure in 2010, keeping labor market conditions
constant.
This ensures that changes in population characteristics between 2010 and 2030 are
solely due to the underlying population scenarios and not caused by potential inconsis-
tencies between our country-level data sources. In a second step, we reweight the 2010
samples such that they precisely reflect the characteristics of each EU population in
terms of age, educational attainment and household structure as projected for the year
2030.7
5A cohort component model is used to project the age and sex distribution while education projections
are based on KC et al. (2010). A comparison of the NIDI population projections by skill level to those of
the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), which provides an EU-wide
population projection for 2020, shows that the two are well aligned in terms of headcounts (CEDEFOP 2012).
6Cf. Deville and Sa¨rndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). For an application of sample reweighting in the
context of tax-benefit microsimulation, see Cai et al. (2006). For applications of reweighting techniques in a
different context — modeling an increase in unemployment — see Immervoll et al. (2006) and Dolls et al.
(2012).
7The household position is differentiated between singles, single parents, children living at home, couples
without children, couples with children and other. Our analysis concentrates on differences between 2010
and 2030 and ignores intermediate developments.
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2.3 Linking labor supply and demand
Our implementation of the supply-demand link (described in more detail in Dolls et al.
2017) defines twelve distinct labor markets in each country, differentiated by marital sta-
tus, gender, and skill level. This ensures a flexible adjustment process as it incorporates
the main sources of heterogeneous labor market behavior. Aggregate labor supply is mod-
eled using a rich set of intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities from Bargain et al.
(2014) along these dimensions. The elasticities account for the fixed costs of work, labor
market restrictions within countries or even states, preference heterogeneity with respect
to age, the presence and number of children as well as unobserved heterogeneity compo-
nents. Table 3 reports aggregated (total) gross wage labor supply elasticities for the different
country groups.
While estimates for males in couples are very similar across country groups and skill
levels (mostly just under 0.1), elasticities for other population groups range from about 0.1
to 0.5 (reaching even 0.65 for single males).
Differences between skill groups are more pronounced for single males and females with
low-skilled workers having the highest labor supply elasticities, followed by high-skilled
workers, while those with medium skills have the lowest elasticities. Men tend to be slightly
more responsive on the extensive margin, the opposite holds for women. Overall, elasticities
for the Eastern European countries are among the lowest, while those for the Anglo-Saxon
and Southern country groups are among the highest.
The demand side is modelled using wage elasticities obtained from the meta-regression
analysis in Lichter et al. (2015). They account for differences in skills, labor market insti-
tutions as well as the importance of specific sectors across countries. The variation within
countries comes from skill differences leading us to two labor demand elasticities per coun-
try grouping (high/medium skilled vs low skilled), as reported in the lower part of Table 3.
By means of the linear-time trend in the meta-analysis, these elasticities are extrapolated
to 2030. This reflects the decreasing trend in labor demand responsiveness which is possi-
bly a consequence of technological change. The resulting demand elasticities for 2030 are
highest for the Eastern and Anglo-Saxon countries (-0.7 to -0.9). Eastern European coun-
tries tend to have less strict laws concerning hiring and separations and this causes lower
adjustment costs for firms and may increase incentives to adjust labor demand in response
to wage changes. Demand elasticities for the other country/skill groups range between -0.5
and -0.6, and are generally higher for the low-skilled.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic mechanism of our supply-demand-link. Starting from the
equilibrium point A in 2010, a decrease in the labor force due to demographic trends (as is
observed in many EU countries between 2010 and 2030), shifts the aggregate supply curve
to the left.8 In the absence of demand-side adjustments, the new equilibrium would be at
point B, resulting in a higher wage due to the higher scarcity of labor. A demand shift can
be expected due to the changing size of the population. As the population is projected to
change, the demand for goods and services can be expected to change accordingly, leading
to a lower or a higher demand for labor. This is represented, in the example in Fig. 1, by
a downward shift of the demand curve which moves the equilibrium point B to C. Point
C denotes wage and employment level in the equilibrium. The resulting relative change in
market wages w1
w0
is fed back into the micro-data to obtain counterfactual individual earnings
8Under the assumption of constant elasticities, any supply/demand curve can be fully characterized by the
elasticity and a single observed point of hours.
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Fig. 1 Linking labor supply and demand. Source: Dolls et al. (2017). Notes: The figure shows an example in
which both the labor force and the population shrink between 2010 and 2030
for 2030.9 These are converted into counterfactual disposable incomes. In order to account
for different responses depending on the worker type, this procedure is carried out separately
for the 12 combinations of gender, couple status and skill level within each country. As the
underlying elasticities are estimated on employees only, earnings of dependent workers is
the only income component altered here. Self-employed wages are hence held constant, as
well as income from rents or capital.
2.4 The decompositionmethod
We follow the decomposition framework in Bargain and Callan (2010) to decompose
changes in the income distribution. Their original application examined historic changes in
the income distributions in France and Ireland. Further studies have applied it in the anal-
ysis of changes in income distributions in the UK (Bargain 2012a, b); in the US (Bargain
et al. 2015) and comparatively for a selection of European countries (Bargain et al. 2017;
Hills et al. 2019; Paulus et al. 2017). Our paper provides the first application of this method
to future income distributions and covers the whole EU-27.
Denote y a matrix with household socio-demographic characteristics and market income
sources (with each row describing a single household). Let d denote the ‘tax-benefit
function’ which calculates household disposable income on the basis of household char-
acteristics, pre-tax and transfer incomes, and a set of tax-benefit policy parameters with
9On the individual level, labor market adjustments are obtained in a two-step procedure. First, for employed
persons, the change in weekly hours is calculated from the intensive labor supply elasticity. In a second step,
the extensive elasticity defines a counterfactual employment rate for this group. To meet this new employment
rate, employable group members’ employment status is changed subsequently until the new employment rate
is met. The number of weekly hours for new labor market entrants (in case of an increasing employment rate)
is determined by the average amount of employed persons sharing the same gender, couple status and skill
level.
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monetary values p (e.g., tax brackets, benefit amounts). We can then express the distribu-
tion of disposable income for the population of year k, under the tax-benefit structure of
year i and the tax-benefit parameters of year j as di(pj , yk). We will be focusing on dis-
tributional indices I (e.g. inequality, poverty), computed as a function of the (simulated)
distribution of disposable income, i.e. I
[
di(pj , yk)
]
. The total change in a given distribu-
tional index between two time periods, t = 0 (e.g. 2010) and t = 1 (e.g. 2030), can be
written as
I = I [d1(p1, y1)] − I [d0(p0, y0)] (1)
This can be decomposed into a (direct) policy effect and changes in population character-
istics (including market incomes), using a (simulated) counterfactual income distribution
d0(αp0, y1) and α to adjust the nominal levels of policy parameters with monetary values.10
I = {I [d1(p1, y1)] − I [d0(αp0, y1)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy effect
+{I [d0(αp0, y1)] − I [d0(p0, y0)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
changes in characteristics
(2)
In this analysis, we consider two possible values for α. The first, unity, reflects an approach
where the two components are assessed without indexing tax-benefit policy parameters
in the counterfactual scenario. More precisely, as wage adjustments presented in the next
section should be interpreted in 2010 levels, the policy parameters should be understood as
kept fixed in real terms for our benchmark. However, when incomes rise faster than prices,
the total number of taxpayers (and the number of higher-rate taxpayers) increases. This
phenomenon of bracket creep (Immervoll 2005) is likely to affect the final distribution of
post-tax income. Therefore, we employ α equal to the change in average market income
between 2010 and 2030 to measure each component against a scenario where tax-benefit
policy parameters are indexed in line with developments in market income, constituting a
distributionally neutral benchmark.11 In what follows, we present only results for α equal
to this distributionally neutral factor but results for the decomposition in which α = 1 are
qualitatively similar. Note that the actual total change between 2010 and 2030 can only
be assessed once micro-data become available for both periods and 2030 tax-benefit pol-
icy rules are known. Here we use projected 2030 market incomes (in real terms), denoting
the new population structure and market income distribution after demographic changes
(alone) as yd . After wage adjustments, the distribution in the new labor market equilibrium
is denoted ydw . We seek to quantify changes in the income distribution, on the basis of an
α valued at the change in average market income (αdw = y¯dw/y¯0):
Ic = I [d0(αdwp0, ydw)] − I [d0(p0, y0)] (3)
The last expression corresponds to the second term in Eq. 2, i.e. the effect of changes in
population characteristics on the income distribution.
We decompose this further to separate a demographic effect from a wage effect. The
demographic effect shows the change in the disposable income distribution, which is due to
demographic change (population ageing, upskilling, etc.), while the wage effect represents
the market reaction to this demographic change through labor demand (and subsequent labor
supply) adjustment. Non-wage income, e.g. income from self-employment or capital, is
10Note that decomposition is path-dependent. Here we show only a version assessing policy effects
conditional on the end-period data.
11Bargain and Callan (2010) argue that gross income inflation is a distributionally neutral factor that seems
most appropriate for such decomposition exercises. The choice of the uprating factor is also discussed in
Bargain (2012a).
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assumed to remain constant in real terms. Omitting subscript 0 and noting that αdw = αwαd ,
the decomposition is presented as follows:
Ic = {I [d(αdwp, ydw)] − I [d(αdp, yd)]} + {I [d(αdp, yd)] − I [d(p, y)]} (4)
= I [d(αdwp, ydw)] − I [d(αdwp, αwyd)](wage effect)
+I [d(αdwp, αwyd)] − I [d(αdp, yd)](income growth, w)
+I [d(αdp, yd)] − I [d(αdp, αdy)](demographic effect)
+I [d(αdp, αdy)] − I [d(p, y)](income growth, d) (5)
Altogether there are five different simulated income distributions. d(p, y) is simply the dis-
tribution of disposable income in 2010.12 d(αdp, yd) and d(αdwp, ydw) correspond to the
distribution of disposable income after demographic changes, and, respectively, before and
after subsequent wage adjustments. Policy parameters with monetary values are adjusted
with αd and αdw = αwαd , respectively, to keep them in line with projected market income
changes. Finally, d(αdp, αdy) and d(αdwp, αwyd), which are used to capture changes in
average income levels, are constructed on the basis of the 2010 distribution and the 2030
distribution (without wage adjustments), respectively, scaling both market incomes and
monetary parameters (with αd and αw , respectively). That is, αdy retains the structural
characteristics of the base year data (in particular, the distribution of market income) but
adopts the average income levels prevailing after demographic changes (and before wage
adjustments). In contrast, αwyd retains the structural characteristics of population after
demographic changes (and before wage adjustments) but adopts the income levels pre-
vailing after wage adjustments. It is worth pointing out again that generally one ought to
consider alternative ordering of components. However, this is not meaningful in our case
as there are no wage responses to demographic changes to consider before the latter are
imposed.
As tax-benefit functions, d(p, y), are usually linearly homogeneous in p and y, a
simultaneous change in nominal levels of both market incomes and monetary tax-benefit
parameters should not affect the relative position of households in the distribution of dis-
posable income. The direct consequence of this is that the terms above capturing nominal
changes (the income growth effects) are approximately zero for scale-invariant distribu-
tional indices13 and we are left with two components: wage effect and demographic effect.
Furthermore, given this approximation, we can estimate the two effects with equation (4),
which is technically easier to implement.
3 2030 population projections
3.1 Demographic changes
Table 4 describes projected changes to the population between 2010 and 2030. We see that
the total EU population in 2030 is projected to slightly decrease in the tough scenario (-3%)
12As the income reference period for the input datasets is either 2007 or 2009, market incomes have first
been updated to 2010 levels using appropriate factors for each income source, which reflect growth in their
average values.
13This has been empirically checked for a number of European countries in Bargain and Callan (2010) and
Bargain et al. (2017)
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and to increase in the friendly scenario (+8%). There are cross-country differences in the
effect with large population increases expected in both scenarios in Belgium, Cyprus, Ire-
land, Luxembourg and Sweden. Conversely, large decreases in the population are projected
for both scenarios in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia.
The EU projected total labor force (15–65 years of age), on the other hand, decreases in
both scenarios (Table 5), though magnitudes differ substantially: about -1% in the friendly
scenario and about -9% in the tough scenario. In the tough scenario, it decreases in all coun-
tries except Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK. The projected decreases
are more drastic for Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia and Bulgaria) as well as for Germany. A declining work force relative to the total
population implies a growing scarcity of workers, which will put upward pressures on wage
levels as depicted in Fig. 1. As the total population is projected to decrease only slightly
or even to increase, depending on the scenario, domestic demand for goods and services is
likely to change little or might even increase. This implies a minimal or even rightward shift
in the LD2010 curve in Fig. 1. Hence, declining labor force in both scenarios is likely to lead
to structural problems as meeting this aggregate demand will become more challenging.
One key development is the ageing of the population. Figure 2 shows that the old-age
dependency ratio, calculated as the number of people over 65, divided by the size of the
labor force, is set to increase in every country by 2030. The black solid bar, which represents
the situation in 2010, shows that there is some heterogeneity in the old-age dependency ratio
across the EU-27. It ranges from 18% in Ireland to 31% in Germany. The largest increases in
this ratio are to be found in the countries with relatively lower old-age dependency ratios in
2010, such as Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Poland and Malta. These countries can expect the
share of old-age dependents to increase by more than 10 percentage points by 2030. Coun-
tries which already have large shares of old-age dependents, such as Belgium, Sweden and
Greece can expect more modest increases. Overall, there seems to be some cross-country
convergence in the old-age dependency ratio.
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Another important trend is the upskilling of the population in both scenarios (Table 6).
The share of highly skilled individuals among the population aged 15–64 is projected to
increase by 5–6 percentage points on average in the tough scenario and by about 11 per-
centage points in the friendly scenario, while the share of low skilled workers decreases
by 5–8 percentage points on average, depending on the scenario. Germany, in the tough
scenario, is the only case where essentially no upskilling is taking place. Changes in the
share of medium skilled workers are more varied, decreasing more in the friendly scenario.
These patterns are consistent across countries but especially pronounced in Cyprus, France,
Lithuania and Poland.
3.2 Effects on wages and labor supply
The main insight from the previous subsection is that the workforce is ageing and becom-
ing more skilled. This will affect real wage levels. First, as older (more educated) workers
have higher wages than younger (less educated) workers, there is a direct positive effect of
demographic change on average wages. Second, there will be wage changes due to labor
demand (LD) and (further) labor supply (LS) adjustments to the new population structure.
Taking these labor market responses into account, the high-skill premium can be expected
to decrease. These developments could affect overall average wages in either direction.
Figure 3 shows projected changes in average real wages (i.e. measured in 2010 prices)
in the tough and in the friendly scenario, distinguishing between the direct effect due to
demographic change and the effect due to wage adjustment to demographic change. There is
no clear correlation between the total change in the average wage (black bar) and the change
in the size of the work force (dark gray bar), indicating that the composition of the projected
workforce also plays an important role in determining wage reactions to population change.
In both scenarios, the changes in average wage range from an increase of less than 5% in
Hungary and Latvia to close to 20% in Germany, Spain and Austria. In most countries,
the first round effect of demographic change, i.e. ageing and upskilling, drives most of
the average wage change. However, countries such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands,
Finland, Estonia, Belgium, Sweden and Malta can also expect large average wage changes
due to the behavioral response to these demographic changes.
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Fig. 3 Average wage changes due to demographic change and the labor market response. Note: Own calcu-
lations. The average wage change shows the change in average wages for workers between 2010 and 2030.
This is decomposed into a demographic effect, which shows the effect of ageing, upskilling and other demo-
graphic changes on wages, ignoring the demand reaction, and a labor market effect which shows the effect
of the labor supply shift on wages taking demand side elasticities into account
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Underlying employment changes are presented in Table 7, showing the share of people
in the labor force working at least part-time in each scenario both before and after wage
adjustments. Unlike with wages, it is not clear a priori how demographic changes affect
employment levels directly before taking further labor market adjustments into account as
older people tend to work less while more educated people tend to work more. Overall,
we find rather small and positive changes in employment rates which are slightly higher
after accounting for wage adjustments, meaning that the wage increases implied by labor
shortages encourage more people (as a proportion of the active population) to work. This
implies that, although the total size of the labor force decreases substantially in most coun-
tries (Table 5), the proportion of the labor force projected to work is, on average, stable and
this is partly due to wage adjustment.
Table 8 shows the total number of labor hours supplied by country in 2010 and in the
two 2030 scenarios, before and after wage adjustment. Total hours of work are projected
to decrease substantially in most countries in the tough scenario. However, as the friendly
scenario projects just a small decrease in the size of the labor force and a slight increase
in employment rates, a slight increase in total hours of work is expected in this scenario.
In both scenarios, most of the movement comes from demographic change with just small
downward adjustments to average hours of work stemming from wage reactions.
4 Eﬀects on income distribution
4.1 Income changes
We now turn our attention to the effect of demographic change and the accompanying wage
adjustment on the income distribution, measured against a benchmark where tax-benefit
policy parameters evolve in line with average market income.14 The increase in household
original income between 2010 and 2030, which is due solely to demographic change, is
denoted α1d (see Section 2.4), while the increase in household original income between 2010
and 2030 which is attributable to wage adjustment corresponds to α1w. Table 9 shows the
magnitude of these income growth rates between 2010 and 2030 by country.
With few exceptions, total income growth is positive between 2010 and 2030 (i.e.
α = αdαw is greater than 1). We generally see an income decline due to demographic
change (αd < 1), which is driven by the large increase in the over-64 population with lit-
tle employment income. This dominates (direct) wage changes due to the increasing share
of older workers and upskilling. This effect is counteracted by strong income growth due
to wage adjustment (αw > 1). There is a quite distinctive grouping of countries along
regions/welfare typologies. It is primarily Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
(together with Germany and Austria) which show the largest decrease in average original
income due to demographics (αd ), while Southern European countries (Portugal, Italy and
Greece) and Ireland exhibit the largest increases.15 The income growth rate due to wage
adjustment is highest in Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the UK.
This can be mostly explained by higher average wages, resulting, among other things, from
14Using a benchmark where tax-benefit policy parameters are fixed in real terms does not alter our
conclusions. Results are available upon request.
15Note also that countries which have been hit harder in the Great Recession tend to have the highest αd .
This could imply that favorable (or less dramatic) demographic projections will allow them to catch up with
other countries to some extent.
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relatively modest upskilling and thus lower downward pressure on wages of high-skilled
workers.
Hungary, Latvia and Malta, in turn, exhibit the most negative income changes. For Hun-
gary and Latvia, this phenomenon can be explained by the projected negative trend in
average wages due to the projected change in the skill composition. Malta, in turn, fea-
tures the largest share of low-skilled workers, who realize modest income increases as the
skill composition changes. Other skill groups, in contrast, partly exhibit strongly negative
income changes, resulting in an overall negative effect.
4.2 Impact on inequality and poverty
The projected impacts of demographic change on income inequality, is presented in Table 2
for the EU-27 as a whole. On average, European Gini coefficients are projected to remain
almost constant in both population scenarios between 2010 and 2030. Demographic change
tends to increase inequality. Higher average wages, however, work in the opposite direct
direction, counteracting this increase to a large extent. This mechanism can be observed for
most inequality measures investigated.
Figure 4 presents country-wise changes of the Gini coefficient. Detailed results are pro-
vided in Table 10 in the Online Appendix. Complementary analyzes for the P90/50 ratio
(which compares the 90th decile of income to the 50th) and the P10/50 ratio (which com-
pares the 10th decile of income to the 50th) can be found in Tables 11 and 12 in the Online
Appendix, leading to similar quantitative conclusions. The circles in Fig. 4 represent the
baseline levels of income inequality in 2010. The projected levels for 2030 before wage
adjustment are indicated by a cross and, after wage adjustment, by a diamond.
Considering the total effect of demographic change on the Gini coefficient of disposable
income, the most affected countries are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Romania and Slovakia.
In the case of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Slovakia, inequality is projected to increase
due to a combination of demographic change and wage reactions. Conversely, Romania can
expect inequality to decrease for the same reason. This trend is confirmed in Table 11, which
decomposes the ratio of the 90th percentile of income to the 50th. This indicates that much
of the movement observed in the Gini index is due to increases (in the Nordic countries and
Slovakia) and decreases (in Romania) in inequality at the top of the income distribution.
Looking lastly at the detailed decomposition of the ratio of the 10th percentile of income to
Table 2 Effects on inequality and poverty in the EU-27
Tough Scenario Friendly Scenario
Total Demographic effect Wage effect Total Demographic effect Wage Effect
Gini coefficient 0.0% 2.1% −2.1% −0.1% 1.7% −1.8%
P90/50 ratio −0.5% 1.7% −2.2% −0.1% −1.9% −1.9%
P10/50 ratio −1.0% −0.9% −0.1% 0.0% −0.1% 0.1%
Poverty Headcount 2.1% 2.4% −0.4% −0.4% 0.9% −1.4%
Poverty Gap 1.4% 4.1% −2.7% −2.6% 1.1% −3.7%
The table shows population-weighted means for the respective index change for the EU-27 from 2010 to
2030. The total effect is decomposed into a demography-induced part (mainly upskilling and ageing) and a
part that captures the labor market response due to a change in the relative supply of skill groups. Country-
specific figures can be found Tables 10 to 14 in the Online Appendix
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Fig. 4 Projected inequality levels between 2010 and 2030 across the EU. Note: Own calculations using
EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data reweighted to 2030 and adjusted for wage reactions to demographic
change. Gini coefficients calculated using equivalized disposable household income. Graphs are sorted in
ascending order by inequality levels in 2010. The underlying figures can be found in Table 10 in the Online
Appendix
the 50th in Table 11, we observe that some of the countries with small changes in the Gini
index are actually projected to have large increases/decreases in inequality at the bottom of
the income distribution. Increases in inequality at the bottom of the income distribution are
projected for Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy and Romania while decreases are noted for
Spain, Malta and Slovakia.
The projected changes in poverty headcounts by country, defined as equivalised house-
hold disposable income of less than 60% of median income, are visualized in Fig. 5 and
detailed in Table 13. Poverty headcount are projected to slightly increase (decrease) in
the tough (friendly) population scenario. These changes are modest, rarely exceeding 5
percentage points where the baseline average is 16%. Unlike inequality, these effects are
driven by two reinforcing effects in both scenarios. On average, both demographic and wage
adjustments increase poverty in the tough scenario and decrease it in the friendly scenario.
A couple of country cases deserve a closer look. We project substantial rises in relative
poverty for Ireland and Portugal in both scenarios. In Ireland, this increase is driven purely
by demographic change while, in Portugal, the increase is due to a combination of demo-
graphic change and wage adjustment. We examine projections for the poverty gap, which
goes beyond the headcount index by weighting very low incomes higher than incomes just
below the poverty threshold (Table 14). The poverty gap is actually projected to decrease in
Ireland, despite an increasing poverty headcount, suggesting that a higher number of house-
holds find themselves just below the poverty line in 2030, but not far below. The poverty
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Fig. 5 Projected poverty headcounts between 2010 and 2030 across the EU. Note: Own calculations using
EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data reweighted to 2030 and adjusted for wage reactions to demographic
change. Graphs are sorted in ascending order by poverty headcount levels in 2010. The underlying figures
can be found in Table 13 in the Online Appendix
headcount increase for Ireland should be interpreted with this in mind. Portugal, in contrast,
shows a strong increase in the poverty gap as well as the poverty headcount, creating by far
the most worrying country case in the EU-27. Apart from these outliers, relative poverty is
projected to undergo marginal changes in most countries.
As a caveat, our approach is not able to account for changing old-age pension claims as a
consequence of changing wage trajectories over the life cycle. This would require a dynamic
modelling of individual earnings profiles, along with the full set of institutional rules of the
respective pension system, ideally also capturing interactions with private and occupational
pension schemes. In light of increasing average wages (Table 3), it is fair to assume higher
pension claims in 2030. Low- and medium-skilled workers will profit in particular from
this, as those groups are becoming more scarce in the future, experiencing more positive
wage changes. For this reason, our results might suffer from underestimating the incomes of
pensioners. Accounting for different pension claims is hence likely to lead to overall lower
projected measures of poverty and inequality.
4.3 Secular rise in employment of older workers
From 2000 to 2016, labor force participation rates of EU workers between 50 and 74 years
increased from 34.7% to 45.5% (men) and from 26.8% to 40.0% (women), respectively,
with no indication of a general slowing down. If this trend reflects genuine changes in labor
supply behavior rather than a mechanical increase from upskilling, our approach does not to
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Fig. 6 Change in Gini Coefficient from secular rise in Employment. Notes: The figure shows the change in
the Gini coefficient of disposable incomes from the anticipated secular increase in labor force participation,
compared to the baseline results (Fig. 4)
capture these changes. We therefore consider also income inequality in 2030 by additionally
assuming a continuation of this secular rise in employment. We use historic time trends in
employment rates from 2000 to 2016 from Eurostat (by age group, sex and skill group) to
predict new age, gender, country and skill specific employment rates for those aged 50-70 in
the year 2030. We regress the employment rate on the year, with the full set interactions of
country groups and skill fixed effects. We allow for differential time trends by sex and age
group (50-55, 56-60, 61-64, 65-70 years) by estimating these models separately. Estimation
results are shown in Table 15 in the Online Appendix. After reweighting the EU-SILC data
to take account of demographic change between 2010 and 2030, we then predict a new
employment rate for those aged 50-70. The LS-LD model is applied to this new reweighted
population in order to calculate new equilibrium employment and wage rates. 16
The results are presented in Fig. 6 for the Gini coefficient and Fig. 7 for the poverty head-
count. These show the change in each measure, compared to the baseline results presented
in Figs. 4 and 5. With few exceptions, the secular increase in labor force participation
leads to higher income inequality, mostly in the range of 1 to 2 Gini points. This result is as
expected as older workers tend to earn more than younger workers.
On average, relative poverty is less affected by the increase in elderly employment. How-
ever, a significant decrease in poverty can be expected in Ireland which actually works to
counteract the 4–5 point increase in the poverty headcount predicted in the baseline scenario
(without secular increases to elderly employment). This hints to pensioners ending up just
below the poverty line being the driving force for the projected rise in poverty in Ireland.
16This procedure will overestimate future employment rates for older workers if the time trend slows down
between 2016 and 2030.
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Fig. 7 Change in Poverty Headcount from secular rise in Employment. Notes: The figure shows the change
in the poverty headcount from the anticipated secular increase in labor force participation, compared to the
baseline results (Fig. 5)
5 The stabilizing capability of European tax-beneﬁt systems
The ability of European tax-benefit systems to stabilise income has been studied by Dolls
et al. (2012) who found that stabilisation of disposable incomes ranged from 25 per cent to
56 per cent of the overall change in market incomes. Stabilisation of income inequality has
also been studied and found to differ substantially from stabilisation of income (Callan et al.
2018; Paulus and Tasseva 2018). In this section, we consider the inequality stabilization
and redistributive capabilities of each of the tax-benefit systems in the EU-27. To this end,
Fig. 8 contrasts changes in market income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient
with changes in disposable income inequality between 2010 and 2030. Several important
findings emerge from this.
First, demographic changes alone (i.e. with constant wages) almost universally increase
market income inequality both in the tough and in the friendly scenario, as the the-
oretical literature on population ageing generally predicts. Inequality increasing effects
are largest (up to 5 percentage points) in larger economies (France, Germany, Spain,
Italy) together with Austria, Finland and Slovenia. The UK and Ireland are on the
other side of the scale with almost no changes in demography-induced market income
inequality.
Second, disposable income inequality, in contrast, increases much less or even decreases,
indicating tax-benefit systems’ built-in capacity to absorb some of the ‘raw’ inequality
increase. This is characteristic of all countries except for Portugal, where, basically, all
changes in market income inequality translate into disposable income inequality. This
is due to the fact that, unlike most other countries, demographic change decreases the
share of low-income recipients in Portugal; the increase in inequality hence reflects an
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Fig. 8 Changes in the Gini coefficient for market and disposable income. Note: Own calculations using
EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data for 2010, reweighted to 2030 and adjusted for wage reactions to
demographic change. The dashed line represents the linear fit
overall income increase (see also Table 9).17 In relative terms, Spain and Cyprus seem
better equipped to withstand increases in market income inequality in either demographic
scenario.
Third, when taking into account wage adjustments, we find more heterogeneous out-
comes in both market and disposable income inequality, with a substantial share of countries
now displaying a decline in the Gini for market income. Finland, Denmark and Slovakia are
found among the countries with the least redistributive capacity in both scenarios.
6 Conclusions
Given their tremendous impact on society, demographic changes are among the most impor-
tant policy challenges in the European Union. Population projections suggest that ageing
and shrinking labor forces will have important implications, not only for fiscal revenue and
social security systems, but also for the income distribution. While the effect of a growing
17This is likely to be due to the increasing educational attainment of the Portuguese labor force. Portugal
is among the countries with the highest initial share of low-skilled workers (67%), which is projected to
decrease by 14 percentage points.
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dependency ratio on fiscal sustainability, in particular with regard to the financing of Euro-
pean welfare states, has been addressed by some contributions in the literature (Dolls et al.
2017), very little is known about its effect on the income distribution.
This paper is the first attempt to fill this gap. Theory predicts that population age-
ing increases income inequality in the population as a whole due to, among other things,
increasingly divergent human capital and lower income towards the end of the life course.
By contrast, the effect of upskilling on income inequality is ambiguous. We investigate the
ability of tax-benefit systems to stabilize these expected changes. We apply a decomposi-
tion approach that enables us to separate the pure demographic effect from resulting labor
market effects on the income distribution in Europe in the year 2030.
We rely on detailed population projections for two different scenarios, ‘tough’ and
‘friendly’, containing joint distributions of age, sex, level of urbanization and educational
attainment as well as household structure. The scenarios can be interpreted as upper and
lower bounds for the severity of demographic change. We take the population projections
to our harmonized European micro data by applying a reweighting procedure. Our partial
labor market model, linking the resulting labor supply and demand responses, provides us
with new wage and employment changes leading to a new labor market equilibrium in each
member state. Implementing these steps sequentially, we are able to isolate the effect of
demographic change from the accompanying effect of wage adjustments.
Our analysis shows that the EU-27 average income inequality, measured by the Gini
coefficient, is projected to increase by 1–2 per cent due to demographic change. Our results
suggest that accompanying wage adjustments partly offset the increased inequality. Notable
increases in inequality are found for Scandinavian countries in particular, which may lead
to cross-country convergence in income inequality. Examining other measures of inequal-
ity, we find that most of the increase is projected to occur in the top half of the income
distribution, whereas income inequality in the bottom half of the income distribution is pro-
jected to undergo only marginal changes. Results are more ambiguous for relative poverty,
which is projected to increase in the tough scenario but slightly decrease in the friendly sce-
nario. In general, projected changes in relative poverty are small but there are some country
exceptions such as Ireland and Portugal.
In an additional analysis, we account for a secular rise in the employment that has been
observed for workers older than 50 years. If this trend is going to continue, one can expect
an additional increase in disposable income inequality of one to two Gini points for most
EU countries, Scandinavian countries and the UK being the exception. Poverty headcounts,
in contrast, are projected to experience only marginal additional changes. This suggests a
non-negligible inequality impact from reforms aiming at higher labor force participation of
older workers, such as raising the statutory retirement age.
Two important general messages emerge. First, the challenges countries face vary and
not all will be exposed to a considerable increase in market income inequality. However,
among those who will, there are some tax-benefit systems better equipped to moderate
such increases than others. Second, tax-benefit systems cushion some of the increases in
market income inequality so that the increase in disposable income inequality is smaller. Our
paper shows that the size of these cushioning effects to a large extent depends on whether
we consider the (direct) demographic effect only or also the resulting wage changes. This
highlights the importance of accounting for labor market adjustments in an analysis such as
the present one.
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